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ABSTRACT. In the last decades, the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation
have been applied more and more in the public sphere. This paper claims that for-
giveness in transitional justice practices is often difficult if not impossible to
achieve, and that it could generate counterproductive processes. It is unclear what
‘collective forgiveness’ is, if it is a realistic concept at all. The expectation of for-
giveness seems to generate much resistance, even when former oppressors take
up responsibility or show regret. Often past-sensibilities are too strong, and in
many victim-groups self-respect is lacking. Moreover, the role of emotions in pub-
lic (and mediated) settings remains obscure. These complexities raise the question
of whether forgiveness is an appropriate ideal to aim at in transitional justice prac-
tices, especially when participants are involved in attempts at reconciliation in more
or less coercive ways. To give up the ideal of forgiveness, however, does not imply
that reconciliation is unattainable. Alternative accounts of reconciliation are pre-
sented which do not start from forgiveness. These alternative accounts show that
reconciliation is possible, but it seems important for former victims to regain some
sense of self-worth and recognition by others first. Only then people can enter into
the long process of rebuilding relationships of trust with former wrongdoers.
KEYWORDS. Collective forgiveness, reconciliation, transitional justice, truth
commission, trust, identity-formation
1. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation were typ-ically applied in the realm of private life. However, in the last
decades these notions have been applied more and more in the public
sphere. Restorative justice conferences and truth commissions as a 
way of accounting for gross human rights violations are just a few of the
examples where forgiveness and reconciliation are at stake.
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Questions arise about when, what, and whom to forgive. Forgive-
ness manifests compassion for wrongdoers but does this mean that the
gift of forgiveness is always a moral act? How does forgiveness relate to
our feelings of justice? Is there such a thing as unforgivable evil? For-
giveness is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand it is a free gift; on the
other hand it can be subject to conditions or an attitude of the wrong-
doer (e.g., repentance, acknowledgment). Even more problematic is the
notion of forgiveness if victims are already dead. Is it possible to ask
someone else than the primary victim for forgiveness? But conversely, is
it possible to refuse forgiveness on behalf of the dead? What if a group
of people is responsible for a certain wrongdoing: can there be such a
thing as collective responsibility or collective guilt? These questions are
even more urgent when forgiveness is reflected upon in the public sphere.
In the private sphere forgiveness is generally viewed as a prerequisite for
reconciliation. However, given the problematic aspects of forgiveness in
the context of transitional justice processes, this would lead us to conclude
that reconciliation is impossible to achieve. This conclusion however is
premature. Alternative accounts of reconciliation are presented that do not
start from forgiveness. These alternative accounts show that reconciliation
is possible, but it seems important for former victims to regain some
sense of self-worth and recognition by others first.
The present paper aims at presenting an inventory of scholarly inter-
pretations and views on forgiveness and reconciliation in the context of
transitional justice practices. Starting from the notion of forgiveness, the
typical aspects of the transitional justice context are discussed. These are
successively: the collective involved, the public context, and the promo-
tion of forgiveness by others (institutional setting). From this discussion
it will follow that forgiveness in the context of transitional justice is a
highly problematic notion and that forgiveness is unlikely to occur. The
third section focuses on reconciliation. After discussing the relation
between forgiveness and reconciliation, different accounts of reconcilia-
tion are presented, together with the conditions for reconciliation. 
Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
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2. FORGIVENESS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICES: THREE PROBLEM-
ATIC ISSUES
Forgiveness is usually viewed as the overcoming of feelings of revenge,
moral hatred, indignation or some other feelings that are related to anger
(Roberts 1995). As such it implies an identity transforming process within
the victim. So far most scholars (more or less) agree. However, where
some authors defend a unilateral view of forgiveness, making it an issue
of the victim irrespective of attitudes of the wrongdoer (see, e.g., Holm-
gren 1994, Enright et al 1994), the majority of authors defend a bilateral
view of forgiveness. According to this view, forgiveness is conditional
upon the attitude of the wrongdoer. Acknowledgment, repentance, and
accountability are just some of the possible conditions.1 Since transitional
justice is about giving an account of the past, forgiveness in this context
is necessarily a matter of both victim and wrongdoer and hence, condi-
tional to attitudes shown by them. If we translate these conditions for
forgiveness into the context of transitional justice practices, problems
arise, which are discussed in the remainder of this section.
Collective aspects of forgiveness
The notions of acknowledgment, repentance, and accountability are prob-
lematic when a wrong is committed by a group of people, which is often
the case in the situations that are at stake in the context of transitional jus-
tice practices. Who is responsible for the wrong committed? Can groups
show repentance? And if collective forgiveness is about the overcoming
of feelings, similar to forgiveness in the private sphere, how must we view
those feelings: can groups have feelings? Except for the topic of collec-
tive guilt and collective responsibility, which is widely addressed (but not
solved!) in philosophical and legal literature, the collective aspects of
remorse, resentment, and other moral feelings have received scarce atten-
tion in literature. Only few authors explicitly discuss this collective aspect
of the emotions involved.
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Govier and Verwoerd (2002a) discuss the practice of institutional
apology. Following the work of sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis (1991) and
philosopher Jean Harvey (1995), they defend the claim that it is not a cat-
egorical mistake to think of an institution or collective as being respon-
sible for wrongdoing, apologizing, and seeking to make moral amends.
However, offering forgiveness on behalf of a group goes further than
speaking the words ‘I forgive you.’ Where apologizing can be viewed as
a form of speech act, forgiveness has the character of a process involv-
ing emotions and the commitment not to act from hostilities rooted in
the transgression by the wrongdoer (Pettigrove 2006, 486).
Pettigrove discusses two ways that we might meaningfully speak about
collective emotions. First, collective emotions might refer to emotions
experienced by a significant percentage of the individuals comprising the
collective. A second way of speaking about collective emotions refers to
the structural features of the collective that reinforce the experience of cer-
tain emotions among its members. These can be either formalized struc-
tural features or informal features. The author gives the example of the
anti-Japanese sentiment reflected in the Chinese educational curriculum
and the government’s encouragement of anti-Japanese protests (Petti-
grove 2006, 491). Whereas the former emotion refers to the emotion
shared by (a part of) the collective, the second type of emotion refers to
the collective itself (the collective’s emotion). However, if we conceive of
collective emotion as the emotion shared by the majority of its members,
it remains to be seen to what extent it differs from the emotion at the indi-
vidual level. It seems that forgiveness is then still something that happens
at the individual level, be it in a public context. In that case, it is impor-
tant to see how these ‘public aspects’ affect the emotional dynamics. If
we conceive of collective emotion in the second sense (i.e., as the collec-
tive’s emotion) I think forgiveness is not the right concept to apply. The
kind of emotions that are at stake in forgiveness processes reflect how the
victim conceives of herself and the wrongdoer. Forgiveness therefore
requires a significant intellectual and affective effort by the victim. It
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involves a transformation that goes further than the revision of certain
beliefs about the wrongdoer. The victim comes to see herself and the
wrongdoer in a new light of shared humanity instead of the dualistic good
(victim) and bad (wrongdoer) distinction (Griswold 2007, 57-58). To
speak of this personal effort in relation to more or less ‘institutionalized
emotions’ seems out of place. So, even though we might speak of harms
committed on the level of the collective, forgiveness is something that
happens between individuals. Hence, if we speak of collective forgive-
ness it is not as much the collective aspect that is important, but it is the
public aspect.
Summarizing, there are conceptual objections to the notion of collec-
tive forgiveness. Either forgiveness occurs between individuals that make
up the collective – and hence it is not a collective that forgives or is for-
given but it is the individual who forgives or is forgiven – or it is not for-
giveness but something else that is at stake. In the former case, it is impor-
tant to know how the public context affects the individual’s emotional
dynamics. In the latter case, it does make sense to speak of “normalized
relations between groups in which the policies of one are no longer hos-
tile to members of the other” (Pettigrove 1991, 496). But to talk of ‘nor-
malized relations’ is something different than identity transformation and
the overcoming of feelings of hatred and revenge.
Public aspects of forgiveness
The previous subsection demonstrated that to be able to speak of forgive-
ness in the context of transitional justice practices, we should take a
deeper look into the public aspects. To make sense of public forgiveness,
we should look in detail into the emotions of the individuals and how
these are affected. The literature shows some hiatus on the topic of emo-
tional dynamics involved in public forgiveness and reconciliation attempts.
Although mostly viewed as similar to forgiveness in the private sphere,
i.e., as ‘the overcoming of feelings of resentment and anger,’ public 
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forgiveness is not widely discussed in terms of feelings and emotions. An
exceptional case is forgiveness in the context of restorative justice con-
ferences, in which ample attention is paid to the role of moral emotions
such as shame, guilt, remorse, etc. In the literature on transitional justice,
on the contrary, these emotions are almost viewed as given.2 To put it
bluntly: victims have pain and acknowledgment and the uncovering of
the truth will help to overcome that pain. However, following the bilat-
eral view of forgiveness, it seems to be a perilous undertaking to discuss
forgiveness, promoted by a commission, without paying attention to the
emotional dynamics involved between the victim and the wrongdoer. The
function of feelings such as shame, guilt, and remorse in the public for-
giveness process needs closer examination. They can multiply in the pres-
ence of public attention, and eventually interact with economic and polit-
ical interests (Griswold 2007).
In this regard, philosophical analysis might be supplemented with
insights from social sciences. The study described in Manzi and Gon-
zaléz (2007), for example, is a valuable first attempt to gain insight into
the role of cognitive and emotional dynamics in post-conflict situations.
They empirically studied forgiveness and reparation related to important
cognitive (victimization, demand for outgroup remorse, and demand for
truth) and emotional (anger, collective guilt, and shame) variables. It
was found that forgiveness does not convey the same meaning for
groups in conflict and that they are associated with different cognitive
and emotional variables. They concluded that people appeared not to be
ready to forgive unless their feelings of anger towards the opposing
group have diminished. Svasek (2002), in her study of ‘transitions’ in
post-socialist Europe, found that emotional dynamics might provide a
locus of resistance to change, and consequently, hamper further recon-
ciliation. Research in restorative justice has shown that victims often
question the sincerity of the emotions shown by the wrongdoers (Daly
2003, 2004). As such, the public setting offers fewer opportunities for
rapprochement.
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In summary, emotions play a crucial role in public forgiveness prac-
tices. Scholarly literature, however, focuses on economic, political, legal,
and social dimensions of these transitions. Further research is needed on
how the emotions, aroused by the public context, affect the victims’ atti-
tude towards their former wrongdoers and vice versa. Neglecting these
emotions may hamper the possibilities of genuine pacification. Contrary
to intimate relationships, where people are more prone to be touched by
emotions, the public setting will hamper rather than trigger empathetic
resonance. As such it is questionable whether forgiveness is an appropri-
ate ideal to aim at.
The promotion of forgiveness by others
The third aspect of forgiveness that I will discuss is the institutional pro-
motion of it, for example by a Truth Commission. This promotion can
be twofold: first, the atmosphere during hearings of a Truth Commission
can encourage people to forgive, and second, the granting of amnesty to
former wrongdoers can be considered a way of promoting forgiveness.
The promotion of forgiveness to individual victims has to do with
the unofficial culture during the hearings of a Truth Commission. For
the South African TRC hearings, for example, Archbishop Desmond
Tutu’s repeatedly asked people to forgive their former wrongdoers. His
well-known assertion that “there’s no future without forgiveness” seems
to reflect this view. As such, the victims were strongly encouraged to
offer this forgiveness. This seems to be at odds with the common view
that people should themselves decide whether or not to forgive and, if
so, when. This informal culture of forgiveness promotion was reinforced
by the institutionalized amnesty arrangements.3 For some of the vic-
tims, granting amnesty felt like a lack of acknowledgment of their own
suffering. As such the institutionalized amnesty arrangement encour-
aged the victims even more to follow the commission’s demand for 
forgiveness.
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If a society pays no heed to brutalities and offences suffered by many
of its citizens, it further damages these vulnerable people because the dis-
regard can be as devastating as the original wrong itself. In literature on
penal law, therapy, and treatment, this lack of acknowledgment has been
termed secondary victimization (Govier and Verwoerd 2002a: 71;
Symonds 1980). Although noticed by some (including Boraine 1996;
Elster 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 2000; Hayner 2000; Rotberg 2000;
Govier and Verwoerd 2002a), not many authors who describe (the dilem-
mas involved in) reconciliation processes explicitly address the question
of how the commission’s emphasis on forgiveness affects the victims. It
is questionable whether people really feel free not to offer forgiveness if
forgiveness is being promoted on such a large scale. The result will most
probably be false forgiveness and a resistance to further reconciliation
(Cf., Svasek 2002; Huyse 2003).
Griswald (2007) conceives of forgiveness and apology as valuable 
private and civic virtues that run the risk of corruption when put to social
and political use. An officially encouraged culture of forgiveness and apol-
ogy runs the risk of politicizing the two. One can think of the ‘re-educa-
tion’ camps in China and Cambodia where coercion or pressure by a
group reduces the gesture of forgiveness to a theatrical gesture on the
political stage. Hamber (2003) states that the individual healing is often
at odds with political, social and international political demands on peo-
ple to leave the past behind. If not sufficient social justice is ensured to
complement the individual healing process, the national forgiveness
attempts can be experienced as ‘false reconciliation’ by the victims, espe-
cially in the absence of full truth and justice. This feeling of ‘false recon-
ciliation’ is intensified when victims feel that the social place in which
they can vent their anger is closed down.
The limited effect of the institutional promotion of forgiveness by the
TRC is confirmed by empirical studies. Some victims who testified to the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) felt that they
were forced to reconcile or expected to forgive the perpetrators (Ham-
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ber 2007, Hamber, Maepa, Mofokeng and Van der Merwe 1998). Based
on an analysis of transcripts of the South African TRC, Chapman (2007)
found that former victims and members of their families who testified at
the violations hearings rarely mentioned the topics forgiveness and rec-
onciliation unless prompted so, and that those who did were generally
not inclined to forgive the perpetrators. Concerning the perpetrators, they
appeared to be reluctant to acknowledge their wrongdoing or to offer
meaningful apologies, expressions of regret, or some form of compensa-
tion to those who had suffered. Based on these data, the effect of the
TRC in terms of the promotion of forgiveness seems limited. Moreover,
although most scholars clearly state that forgiving is not the same as for-
getting, victims often equate forgiveness with pardoning or think that it
implies forgetting. As such the promotion of forgiveness might be an
unintended offence to the victims who feel that they simply need to for-
get the harm done to them. According to the view of social scientists
working in political science, this feeling is not unfounded. The political
push toward forgiveness can too easily be exploited by politicians to hide
the truth about the past (Hamber 2007).
Summarizing, this section discussed three problematic aspects of for-
giveness in the transitional justice practices. Apart from the conceptual
objection to collective forgiveness, empirical research is needed into the
emotional dynamics involved in pacification processes and the institu-
tional setting of forgiveness. In the next section, we will see that the fore-
going does not force us to give up the ideal of reconciliation altogether. 
3. RECONCILIATION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICES
Reconciliation and forgiveness are often mentioned together. Except for
the conceptual distinction between the two – forgiveness refers to the
identity transforming process within the victim, reconciliation involves
the coming together of two (or more) people – reconciliation is also the
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more secular notion of the two. Forgiveness, as a moral act, has a strong
religious connotation, with different meanings in different religious com-
munities (Haas 2004). Reconciliation, on the other hand, can be framed
both from a religious and from a secular perspective. Its central place in
transitional justice is just one illustration of how the notion of reconcili-
ation transcends the boundaries between the sacred and the secular and
enters the political domain.
Rather generally, reconciliation prevents, once and for all, the use of
the past as the seed of renewed conflict (Huyse 2003). Some authors
explicitly define reconciliation as the end of a process, the ultimate goal
(see, e.g., Roberts 1995; Yandell 1998; Coleman 1998; Foster 2000; Polle-
feyt 2004). According to this view forgiveness is the necessary means to
reach reconciliation. Roberts (1995), for example, states that “the teleol-
ogy of forgiveness is reconciliation” (299). Pollefeyt (2004) argues that
“forgiveness is possible without reconciliation. Reconciliation, however,
is not possible without forgiveness. A relation that is transformed, but in
which the evildoer is not forgiven, cannot be called a relation in the fullest
sense of the word” (63).
It is questionable whether this reasoning holds for a public context
as well. First, in the private sphere, people can choose to engage in a rela-
tionship. The kind of relationships that are at stake in the public sphere
have a more ‘unavoidable’ character: Israeli people cannot ignore the pres-
ence of Palestinian people, while the black South Africans cannot pretend
there are no white South Africans, and so they must try to find some way
of living together. Second, to forgive someone, one may need to talk to
the wrongdoer, hear his or her narrative. The identity transformation we
speak of if forgiveness is at stake, at least requires a reframing of the
wrongdoer by the victim. It is questionable whether this reframing can
occur without trying to get into some sort of dialogue, and hence relation,
with the wrongdoer.
It seems that reconciliation can occur at different levels. Most authors
who hold the view that forgiveness involves more than reconciliation
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defend a view in which reconciliation can take place in varying degrees.
It is not an all-or-nothing concept (see, e.g., Villa-Vicencio 2000; Knight
2004; Govier & Verwoerd 2002b; Verwoerd 2007). Reconciliation implies
“the restoration and sometimes the establishment of a hitherto non-exis-
tent relationship of trust” (Villa-Vicencio 2000, 208) or the “coming
together after a rift, a rift that undermines trust between the parties”
(Govier & Verwoerd 2002b, 185). The emphasis on trust building allows
for a more fine-grained conception of reconciliation. Although at all lev-
els, reconciliation aims at the building and sustaining of relationships with
sufficient closeness and trust to handle future conflicts and problems, this
(re)building and sustaining of trust relations can occur at different levels:
from very intimate relationships of friendship to the ability to work
together or to peaceful co-existence. As such, not forgiveness but some
form of trust is the prerequisite for reconciliation. Reconciliation can also
point to the aim for an enlarged sense of human connection and respon-
sibility. A confession can be restorative and healing, a movement towards
relational wholeness. If a relation is restored in its wholeness, this may lead
to forgiveness. In other cases, it may not lead to forgiveness but to the
promise of reconciliation. Not forgiveness but engagement and relational
wholeness are the central notions according to this view (Knight 2004).
Applied in a public context, this layered approach of reconciliation
seems to be more promising than the view according to which forgive-
ness is the sine qua non for reconciliation. It is rather the other way around:
reconciliation may – but does not necessarily do so – provide a way to
forgiveness.
Conditions for reconciliation
Given this layered approach of reconciliation, how can we frame recon-
ciliation at the macro-level and what are the conditions for reconciliation
to take place? Grob (2004) discusses reconciliation in the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and he points to the self-critique that lies at the
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heart of all genuine reconciliation. Each side of the conflicting parties
must “radically call into question the dominant story or narrative that has
guided its adoption of positions during the course of conflict” (200),
hereby not suggesting that there is only one Palestinian narrative or one
Zionist narrative. Susan Dwyer (1999) goes further. Not just the calling
into question of existing narratives but the construction of a new master
narrative lies at the core of a genuine reconciliation process. She defends
a notion of reconciliation in terms of tensions in personal narratives. Rec-
onciliation, according to this view, can be understood as the incorpora-
tion of those tensions. In the light of the South African TRC, Dwyer tries
to give an account of reconciliation at the national level. The core notion
is that of bringing apparently incompatible descriptions of events into
narrative equilibrium. This is why uncovering what happened is so impor-
tant. The first thing that is required is a clear view of what happened:
who did what to whom and when. But the task is then to move beyond
the mere statements of agreed-upon facts, and move toward mutually
acceptable interpretations of those events. The latter does not require that
all involved agree on a single interpretation, only that they are mutually
tolerant of a limited set of interpretations.4 Dwyer makes a clear distinc-
tion between forgiveness and reconciliation. Arriving at such a narrative
equilibrium might, but need not, involve an apology and an offer of for-
giveness. As such, neither an apology from the wrongdoer nor forgive-
ness offered by the victim is prerequisite for reconciliation, but “the con-
struction of a coherent narrative that encompasses both atrocities of
apartheid and the hope for a peaceful, respectful coexistence of political
equals.”
The emphasis on personal narratives seems to overlook the nature of
the tensions. People and their relationships – not their narratives – are
alienated from one another and need to be reconciled (Govier and Ver-
woerd 2002b). Govier and Verwoerd argue that the reconciling of what
were incompatible accounts of events is not strictly necessary for individ-
uals or groups to reconcile. People may agree to come together, even
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while continuing to differ on contested events. However, even if congru-
ency between different people’s narratives is not a necessary condition
for reconciliation, it does point to an important aspect of rapprochement.
If the different parties are willing to come together without agreeing on
what exactly happened, they still have to agree on what is acceptable and
what is not.5 Even if people do not agree on the content of other peo-
ple’s narrative, they should adopt a sort of meta-consensus concerning the
legitimacy of other people’s narratives, comparable to a Habermas’ notion
of communicative rationality, which does not require substantive unifor-
mity of rationality but which does require some procedural or formal
agreement on what counts as rational (Habermas 1992).
Given that narrative equilibrium is not a necessary condition, is it a suf-
ficient condition for reconciliation to take place? To answer this question,
it might be a good starting point to look at an important obstacle of rec-
onciliation. Especially for victims, the experience of being wronged can
dramatically affect their feeling of self-worth and consequently their trust
in others, which is conceptually elaborated by Axel Honneth (1992). Hon-
neth’s account of identity-formation requires the recognition of others.
The normative self-image of each and every individual is dependent on the
possibility of being continually backed up by others. Those who have been
wronged by others can develop a negative self-image, which “carries with
it the danger of an injury that can bring the identity of the person as a
whole to the point of collapse” (1992, 131 – 132). If we follow Honneth’s
account of identity-formation, one’s relationship to oneself is an intersub-
jective process. It requires the capacity to trust one’s own sense of what
one needs or wants (self-confidence), a sense of possessing universal dig-
nity, which has to do with viewing oneself as entitled to the same status
and treatment as every other person (self-respect), and the absence of sys-
tematic denigration from outside one’s subculture (self-esteem). This capac-
ity is a precondition for self-realization in any human community.
This brings us back to the problem we found with the collective inter-
pretation of forgiveness. In the discussion on forgiveness, we found that
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forgiveness, because it requires an identity transformation by the wrong-
doer, cannot be framed collectively. But here we see that a similar prob-
lem holds for reconciliation. Before we can consider reconciliation at the
macro-level, people need to develop the capacity for identity formation
first. As such, the narrative account of reconciliation moves too fast, and
maybe too far, in its quest for reconciliation. The gap between question-
ing one’s own narrative and accepting the other’s might be a gap too wide
to bridge if one is deprived of the basic feelings of self-worth. For vic-
tims to be able to reconcile with their former wrongdoers, it seems impor-
tant to regain some sense of self-worth and recognition by others first.
Only then people can start to rebuild relationships of trust with their for-
mer wrongdoers.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The previous sections showed that the notion of forgiveness in the con-
text of transitional justice practices is a difficult undertaking. First, there
is the conceptual objection against the notion of the collective that is at
stake when we talk about forgiveness in transitional justice practices. Sec-
ond, and maybe more importantly, there are empirical objections. How
do the emotions involved affect the pacification process and what kind
of forgiveness can be offered if forgiveness is publicly promoted? With-
out a thorough understanding of the emotional dynamics involved, paci-
fication attempts may be fruitless (in the positive case) or counterproduc-
tive in the worst case scenario.
These complexities raise the question of whether forgiveness must be
viewed as a necessary condition in peacemaking at all. In collective
processes, it is questionable whether forgiveness is an appropriate ideal to
aim at, especially when participants are involved in attempts at reconcili-
ation in more or less coercive ways. For communities that have suffered
under severe violence and humiliation, it seems more important to regain
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some basic sense of self-worth and trust in one’s own identity. Reconcil-
iation, in its most general form, should aim to prevent the use of the past
as the seed of renewed conflict. Sustainable reconciliation requires that
people have some basic sense of self-worth and recognition by others.
Only then can people enter into the long process of rebuilding relation-
ships of trust with former wrongdoers.
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NOTES
1. Alternative interpretations of forgiveness are possible in which forgiveness is bilateral but
not conditional to attitudes or acts shown by the wrongdoer. Van Tongeren, for example, con-
ceives of forgiveness as an intersubjective process. It is an act happening between victim and
wrongdoer rather than performed by them. This makes the subjects dependent on something they
cannot control. As such, forgiveness may be called conditioned, but without the acts to be per-
formed being conditional (Van Tongeren 2008).
2. Svasek (2002), for example, studied the ‘transitions’ in post-socialist Europe, and she
found that the emotional dynamics involved in these transitions have been virtually ignored by
scholars in favor of economic, political, legal, and social dimensions of these phenomena.
3. From a conceptual point of view, the granting of amnesty can be defended as being a
form of tertiary forgiveness. Just as there are primary, secondary (relatives of primary victims), and
tertiary victims (the society), it is possible to offer primary, secondary, and tertiary forgiveness (Ver-
woerd 2007). E.g., parents of a son who has been shot by a racist killer can offer forgiveness for
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the wrong done to them, viz. the killing of their son, but they cannot offer forgiveness on behalf
of the dead son. Analogously, the state can offer the same wrongdoer forgiveness for the tertiary
harm, i.e., violating the law. As such the offering of amnesty as part of a transitional justice proj-
ect can be considered a form of tertiary forgiveness. Accordingly, the conceptual difference
between primary and secondary victims on the one hand and tertiary victims on the other allows
for these institutionalized amnesty arrangements. After all, amnesty is considered a form of terti-
ary forgiveness and hence it is up to the tertiary victim to decide whether or not to offer forgive-
ness. From a more empirical point of view, this solution seems rather academic. For a society
recovering from a traumatic past, the question of how the granting of amnesty relates to the peo-
ple’s feelings of justice seems more important than the question whether a government has the
‘right’ to offer this tertiary form of forgiveness.
4. Dwyer uses the word ‘congruency’ to refer to this situation of narrative equilibrium. How-
ever, given the fact that people don’t have to agree on one single interpretation the word congru-
ency would be due here.
5. Cf. Zalaquett’s remark that “reconciliation is not possible if the two main parties do not
have a secret agreement about what they see as mutually important” (quoted in Antjie Krog, 1998,
132).
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